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“What Others Dare Not Say”: An Antisemitic Conspiracy Fantasy 
and Its YouTube Audience
Daniel Allington and Tanvi Joshi
INTRODUCTION 
Conspiracism has sometimes been theorised as 
an almost universal cognitive tendency,1 with 
one popular introduction to the topic asserting 
that “huge numbers of people are conspiracy 
theorists when it comes to one issue or another.”2 
However, conspiracy believers evidently exist 
on a cline or spectrum, from those who may 
give only provisional credit to specific conspiracy 
accusations to those for whom fantasies of 
conspiracy appear to provide a complete 
explanation of human society: as Aaronovitch 
puts it, “an idea of the world in which the 
authorities, including those we elect, are system-
atically corrupt and untruthful.”3 Although such 
a worldview is today associated with both popu-
list and extreme manifestations of the political 
left and right,4 it is historically most closely asso-
ciated with the antisemitic far right. Moreover, it 
is the centrality of conspiracy theory that most 
clearly distinguishes antisemitism from other 
forms of bigotry, such as anti-black racism.5
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The current study takes for its object a 
video by the professional conspiracy theorist, 
David Icke, and the reception of the video by 
that proportion of its YouTube audience that 
actively responded by leaving comments or by 
clicking the “like” button on existing comments. 
A historical discourse analysis of one of Icke’s 
most popular videos is followed by a quantitative 
content analysis which treats both comments 
and “likes” of comments as reception data. This 
analysis provides evidence of the extent to which 
the video was accepted or rejected by its active 
online audience, as well as of the extent to which 
that audience responded to the video’s thinly 
veiled antisemitism with comments expressing 
anti-Jewish views of their own or extending its 
accusations of conspiracy from the “Rothschild 
Zionist” secret society of Icke’s imagination 
to real-world Jewish collectivities such as the 
State of Israel. But it also focuses attention on 
the mechanism by which the active audience is 
able to introduce bias into the “paratexts” with 
which YouTube surrounds each video.6 We argue 
that by outsourcing the evaluation of comments 
to a faceless, unaccountable online community, 
YouTube has inadvertently acted to protect 
bigoted and irrational video content from criti-
cism and rebuttal.
Conspiracy Theory and Violent Extremism
Historical causality is never straightforward. 
But as Herf argues, “it was the conspirato-
rial aspects of modern antisemitism that were 
most important in fostering its radical, geno-
cidal implications.”7 The Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion—a fraudulent and plagiaristic work of 
Tsarist propaganda purporting to expose a Jewish 
conspiracy to control the world through high 
finance and the press—formed a key ideological 
resource first for German nationalist terrorists, 
and then for the Austro-German Nazi regime.8 
In Britain, the Protocols were sold by the British 
Union of Fascists and promoted by the Britons: 
a far-right organisation which proposed the 
expulsion of all Jews, and even entertained the 
idea of killing Jews.9 Editors or publishers of 
the Protocols in other European countries not 
infrequently became significant figures in Nazi 
client regimes, with responsibility for imple-
menting aspects of the Final Solution,10 and 
interviews with SS concentration camp guards 
show that they “believed absolutely in the Jewish 
world-conspiracy.”11 A. K. Chesterton, founder 
of the National Front—an extreme right-wing 
British group—published a book-length work 
arguing first for the existence of an interna-
tional conspiracy and then for the predomi-
nantly Jewish character of that conspiracy.12 
After Chesterton’s death, that work was incor-
porated into the radicalisation strategy used by 
the National Front, which made open allega-
tions of a conspiracy involving international 
finance, and employed more discreet means to 
identify the conspirators as Jewish.13 Historical 
evidence shows that antisemitic conspiracy 
beliefs have played a role in motivating far 
right terrorist attacks in the United States, espe-
cially in white supremacist movements such as 
Christian Identity.14 Today, conspiracy beliefs 
form a component of multiple forms of polit-
ical and religious extremist ideology,15 and are 
near-ubiquitous on the extreme right.16 As the 
introduction to a report on exchanges of such 
beliefs between the far right and the far left 
observes, “[t]hey are the lifeblood of hateful 
extremism: a way of explaining the world that 
involves identifying an evil enemy that is respon-
sible for all the bad things that are happening.”17
It therefore seems appropriate that a UK 
government agency should have expressed 
concern regarding “the proliferation of 
conspiracy theories, including online, and the 
potential impact on radicalising people’s atti-
tudes and behaviour towards others.”18 There 
has been a recent spate of terror attacks whose 
perpetrators or alleged perpetrators both iden-
tify with the political right and espouse belief in 
conspiracy theories.19 Researchers have stressed 
the importance of Islamophobic conspiracy 
theories in the ideology of Anders Breivik, 
who killed seventy-seven people in 2011.20 
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The alleged Pittsburgh synagogue shooter, who 
killed eleven, was motivated by belief in the 
“white genocide,” “great replacement,” or “great 
substitution” conspiracy: the idea that a malev-
olent (and usually Jewish) elite has promoted 
non-white immigration into majority-white 
nations in order to weaken and dominate the 
white population.21 The alleged perpetrator of 
the Christchurch mosque shooting, in which 
fifty-one died, released a manifesto endorsing 
the same conspiracy fantasy, as did the alleged 
perpetrators of the El Paso mall shooting, in 
which twenty-two died, the Poway synagogue 
shooting, in which one died, and the Oslo 
mosque shooting, which resulted in no fatali-
ties although it has been connected to a murder 
committed elsewhere.22 
Although the causes of deviant human 
behaviour are never easy to establish, it is intui-
tive to propose a link between the narratives that 
are commonly referred to as conspiracy theories 
and the acts of terror that some enthusiasts for 
such narratives commit. This is both because of 
thematic parallels between the narratives and 
the acts, and because the idea of a link has not 
infrequently been highlighted by the perpetrators 
themselves, or by those who speak for them. For 
example, lawyers for convicted terrorist Cesar 
Sayoc, who mailed explosive devices to a series 
of prominent critics of Donald Trump, presented 
their client as a vulnerable individual who became 
“fixated on conspiracy theories [that] he read 
about on social media.”23 The parallels between 
Sayoc’s conspiracist beliefs and his crimes were 
nowhere more apparent than with regard to the 
first of his targets, the famously Jewish investor 
and philanthropist, George Soros:
Sayoc circulated one meme at least seven times 
that described Soros as a ‘Judeo-plutocratic 
Bolshevik Zionist world conspirator’. Sayoc also 
made death threats through Twitter, including 
one against Soros and another against a gun 
control activist linked to him in a conspiracy 
theory that [Sayoc] circulated at least 99 times. 
On the day that [Sayoc’s] pipe bomb was 
delivered to Soros’s address, Sayoc shared a 
cluster of anti-Soros memes. These included one 
from [David] Icke proclaiming urgently that . . . 
“[THE] WORLD IS WAKING UP TO THE 
HORRORS OF GEORGE SOROS”.24
Although Sayoc apparently did not intend 
to be identified and captured, the other cases 
outlined above suggest that a pattern has been 
established whereby right-wing extremists 
attempt to use mass shootings as a means of 
providing their own conspiracy fantasies with 
an online audience. In a livestream broadcast 
begun just before the Halle synagogue shooting, 
in which two died, the alleged perpetrator 
denied the reality of the Holocaust, outlined 
a conspiracy fantasy about feminism and mass 
immigration, and finished with the words: 
“The root of all these problems is the Jew.”25 
(Just as disturbingly, the mother of the accused 
subsequently told journalists that her son had 
nothing against Jews, only against “the people 
who stand behind financial power”:26 it is only 
from a conspiracist viewpoint that such a claim 
can make sense, given that the shooter struck 
not at an investment bank or stock exchange but 
at a Jewish place of worship.) To take another 
example, the perpetrator of the Hanau shisha 
bar shootings, who killed ten, held multiple 
conspiracy beliefs concerning secret societies, 
paedophilia, satanism, mind control, and 
“targeted individuals”—of which he believed 
himself to be one. His now-deleted website 
featured an illustrated autobiography in which 
he provided what he considered to be evidence 
for his supposed lifelong surveillance, expressed 
racist and genocidal views, and called for a 
strike both against the organisation that he saw 
as his nemesis and against the “degeneration” of 
the German Volk.27 A few days before carrying 
out his crimes, he released a YouTube video 
announcing that the United States is “under 
control of invisible secret societies” who “abuse, 
torture, and kill little children in an unbelievable 
amount,” and exhorting all Americans to “turn 
off the mainstream media” and “fight now.”28 
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Although conspiracy fantasies constantly 
re-emerge in new forms, they are highly repet-
itive, forming a cultural tradition thoroughly 
conventional in its fundamentals. For example, 
the “great replacement” conspiracy theory 
is often attributed to contemporary French 
writer Renaud Camus,29 but something closely 
resembling it was observed to be central to 
National Front ideology as long ago as the 
1970s.30 Indeed, we would argue that it can 
be traced back at least as far as Adolf Hitler, 
who was obsessed with the supposed threat of 
race-mixing and wrote that the “ultimate aim” 
of “the Jew” is “the . . . chaotic bastardisation 
of the other peoples, the lowering of the racial 
level of the highest, and domination over this 
racial mush through the eradication of these 
peoples’ intelligentsias.”31 Today, variants on that 
theory are widely circulated in YouTube videos 
produced by individuals such as the aforemen-
tioned David Icke, who holds that an influx of 
non-European (Muslim) migrants to Europe 
is being organised by George Soros (as noted 
above, a Jew and an investor) on the orders 
of the Rothschild family (famous both for its 
Jewishness and for its association with banking), 
with the intention of rendering Europe more 
susceptible to control.32 Identification of such 
thematic and rhetorical echoes is the key meth-
odological principle in the historical discourse 
analysis below.
YouTube, Conspiracy Theory, and Far-Right 
Radicalisation
YouTube plays an important role in dissemi-
nating conspiracy theories.33 Research suggests 
that its recommendation engine may be algo-
rithmically biased towards content of this type.34 
Moreover, a growing body of opinion character-
ises YouTube as a key component in the radical-
isation infrastructure of the contemporary far 
right. As British campaigning group HOPE not 
hate writes with regard to the white supremacist 
movement known as the “alt-right,”
alt-right content producers have continued to 
see growth on YouTube, which is both central 
in disseminating their message and . . . rela-
tively lenient towards the alt-right. YouTube 
also allows alt-right accounts . . . to monetise 
their channels, supplanting platforms . . . 
where users may have been blocked.35 
A recent study of YouTube comments found 
that “users consistently migrate from milder 
to more extreme content” on a “radicalisation 
pipeline” that runs from channels devoted to 
the discussion of controversial topics such as race 
via channels that “constantly flirt with concepts 
associated with [white supremacism],” especially 
conspiracy fantasies, to overt white supremacist 
channels.36 A smaller study concluded that, while 
media attention has generally focused on the 
influence of off-mainstream online fora such as 
4chan, “much [right wing] extremist content is 
happening front and centre, easily accessible on 
platforms [such as] YouTube.”37
In June 2019, policy changes were 
announced to counter the spread of hate speech 
on YouTube,38 although it was subsequently 
found that “significant antisemitic and white 
supremacist content continues to be accessible 
on YouTube even after the policy update.”39 
Moreover, because of YouTube’s policy of toler-
ance with regard to infractions committed 
before the policy change, many YouTube chan-
nels remain online despite having had older 
videos taken down in response to judgements 
of hateful content. One such channel belongs 
to David Icke.
David Icke
Former sportsperson, television presenter, and 
political spokesperson David Icke is a profes-
sional conspiracy theorist. He sells a range of 
merchandise, including self-published books, 
and gives public talks to paying audiences. His 
work is characterised by the fabrication of what 
Barkun calls “superconspiracies,” or “conspira-
torial constructs in which multiple conspiracies 
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are believed to be linked together hierarchically,” 
with “a distant but all-powerful evil force [said to 
be] manipulating lesser conspiratorial actors.”40 
Icke’s fantasies range across many conceptual 
domains, such as paedophilia, cannibalism, 
Satanism, child sacrifice, and mind control, as 
well as the idea that humans are enslaved by 
non-humans. But for all their morbid diver-
sity, these narratives endlessly return to Jewish 
themes and Jewish villains: to George Soros and 
the Rothschild family, to Israel and to Zionism. 
His fans include such luminaries as the rock 
musician, Matt Bellamy, and the novelist, Alice 
Walker. 41
Scholarly discussion of Icke has often glossed 
over the more troubling aspects of his fantasies. 
For example, Lewis and Kahn write that “Icke’s 
project is two-fold: to provide a searching and 
devastating critique of the mainstream and then 
to offer an alternative, love, as a positive vision 
which might replace that which he has previously 
annulled.”42 However, they make no attempt to 
explain why this “positive vision” should appeal 
to the violent neo-Nazi terrorist group Combat 
18, among whose members they acknowledge 
some of Icke’s fans to be found.43 Similarly, 
Ward and Voas present Icke as a leading expo-
nent of “conspirituality,” which they define as “a 
means by which political cynicism is tempered 
with spiritual optimism.”44 But they dismiss the 
racism and antisemitism of conspiracy culture 
with an uncritical quotation of Icke’s claim that 
“[w]e need to drop the ludicrous, childish labels 
of Jew and Gentile and Muslim and all this 
illusory crap and come together in the name of 
peace and justice for all.”45 
Such claims should never be taken at face 
value. When made publicly in contexts where 
both public opinion and the law hold racism to 
be wrong, expressions of racism are customarily 
accompanied by denials of racism.46 And this 
is no less true of antisemitism, accusations of 
which are routinely deflected through appeals 
to an easily-disavowed definition of antisemitism 
such as “hatred of Jews for their Jewishness.”47 
Today, we are most accustomed to hearing such 
deflections from the political left, as when the 
authors of a book defending the UK Labour 
Party from accusations of antisemitism define 
antisemitism as “an irrational hatred of Jewish 
people.”48 But this argumentative manoeuvre 
appears to have originated on the far right. In 
1970, for example, the openly racist National 
Front (see above) claimed not to be “anti-Jewish” 
on the grounds that “none of [its] policies [were] 
directed against Jewish people or Jewishness as 
such” (emphasis added) and that it purportedly 
“criticise[d] . . . Zionists” not on account of 
their “race or religion” but “solely on account of 
their politics.”49 In practice, this has led to the 
development of a form of antisemitism “which 
claims to value highly the distinction between 
hostility to Zionism, or Israel, on the one hand, 
and Jews, on the other.”50 As Billig has observed 
with regard to the National Front, this involves 
using the word “Zionism” in its ordinary polit-
ical sense, that is, as denoting “the movement of 
Jewish nationalism and commitment to the state 
of Israel,” in order to “argu[e] for the political 
acceptability of an anti-Zionist stance,” whilst 
at the same time continuing to use the word 
“Zionist” in order to evoke “the myth of a Jewish 
world conspiracy.”51 Icke’s avowed desire to 
“drop the . . . childish labels” need therefore be 
taken no more seriously than the cliché, “some 
of my best friends are black.”
A more penetrating analysis is provided by 
Barkun, who observes that, while Icke does not 
deny the Holocaust, he blames it on “mysterious 
Jewish elites,” especially the Rothschild family, 
which he alleges “brought Hitler to power,” 
created Zionism, and “control[s] the State of 
Israel.”52 This is a particularly offensive and 
historically illiterate example of the “Holocaust 
inversion” that characterises much contempo-
rary antisemitic discourse.53 As Barkun notes, 
Icke has repeatedly endorsed the accuracy of the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and has ‘clearly 
sought to cultivate the extreme right’, having 
‘not start[ed] out on the political right . . . but in 
time . . . c[o]me to accept much of the Christian 
Patriot position.”54 
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ANALYSIS I: HISTORICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
OF DAVID ICKE’S VIDEO “WHAT OTHERS DARE 
NOT SAY”
This first analysis presented in this article focuses 
on a video uploaded to Icke’s official YouTube 
channel on May 23, 2016, under the title of 
“David Icke—What Others Dare Not Say.”55 By 
the time of data collection in September 2018, 
it had accumulated 803605 views and 4275 
comments. In apparent consequence of the afore-
mentioned 2019 crackdown, the video page was 
eventually replaced with a placeholder stating 
that the video had been removed “for violating 
YouTube’s policy on hate speech.” But at the time 
of writing, at least two further videos featuring the 
same content remained on Icke’s official YouTube 
channel.56 Moreover, the removed video had also 
been uploaded on other YouTube channels.57
The video presents an extract from a public 
lecture. Although the lecture also involves attacks 
on Israel couched in the language of anti-racism, 
its most notable feature is a list of prominent 
Jews. This list immediately follows the claim that 
“Israel is the fiefdom of the Rothschild dynasty, 
which also controls the American administration 
[and] the British administration.” Such claims 
are characteristic of “antisemitic antizionism,” 
an ideology within which Zionism is conceived 
as “a political, financial, military, and media 
conspiracy that is centred in Washington and 
Jerusalem.”58 Antisemitic antizionism, which may 
also be referred to as antizionist antisemitism,59 
can arguably be traced back to the Protocols them-
selves, which claimed to record a speech delivered 
to the First Zionist Congress. It can certainly 
be associated with the Nazi understanding of 
Jewish ambitions for a national home in terms 
of a “conspiracy theory . . . [in which] the Zionist 
project was [seen as] one component of inter-
national Jewry’s drive for world domination.”60
Evidently aware that producing a list of Jews 
might be considered antisemitic, Icke begins 
with a denial of antisemitism:
In the Matrix movie, there’s something 
called the “Zion mainframe.” Well, Zionism, 
Rothschild Zionism, is in so many ways the 
main frame of this network, it pervades all the 
way through, and it’s not about “oh, there’s 
Jewish people here and there’s Jewish people 
there,” it’s Rothschild Zionists who are there, 
and they answer to the Rothschild dynasty, 
therefore they play out the agenda of the web 
in a coordinated way.
The “network” or “web” in question is 
represented by an image of a spiderweb onto 
which a number of symbols have been crudely 
superimposed: mostly national flags, but 
also logos of major corporations including 
Monsanto, Goldman Sachs, and the BBC; 
closest to the centre is a Rothschild family tree. 
The Rothschilds have long been the subject of 
antisemitic conspiracy theories,61 while the use 
of “Zionist” as euphemism for “Jew” has now 
become widespread in certain political circles,62 
and implicit depiction of the Rothschild family 
as the spider at the centre of a web draws on 
well-established traditions of antisemitic visual 
culture in which the Jew is seen as a many-
limbed creature such as a spider or octopus and 
also as a “wire-puller” connected to his minions 
by a network of radiating threads.63 The substi-
tution of “Rothschild Zionists” for “Jewish 
people,” which forms the heart of Icke’s denial of 
racism, must also be seen in context of the bogus 
statistical argument that immediately follows:
Before I start, one fact: Jewish people in 
America are less than two percent of the popu-
lation, a significant number of them will not be 
Rothschild Zionists, and therefore the ratio of 
Rothschild Zionists is even smaller, significantly 
smaller than the two percent.
Icke argues that because some Jews are 
not “Rothschild Zionists,” the number of 
“Rothschild Zionists” in America must be 
smaller than the number of American Jews, 
and that the overrepresentation of “Rothschild 
Zionists” in American politics is therefore 
greater than one would think if one began with 
the assumption that all Jews are “Rothschild 
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Zionists.” But that conclusion can only follow 
if there are virtually no “Rothschild Zionists” 
who are not Jews. In other words, Icke implies 
that while not all Jews are “Rothschild Zionists,” 
there are so few “Rothschild Zionists” who are 
not Jews that the existence of such non-Jewish 
“Rothschild Zionists” does not need to be 
taken into account in estimating the overall 
number of “Rothschild Zionists” in America. 
The association of “Rothschild Zionism” with 
Jewishness—already obvious in the use of the 
name “Rothschild” and the word “Zionism”—is 
thereby affirmed. Moreover, Icke’s assertion of a 
disproportionately high “ratio” is very familiar 
from antisemitic propaganda. Indeed, it is the 
same argument that was made in one of the first 
antisemitic editorials published in Henry Ford’s 
notorious Dearborn Independent: 
Here in the United States, it is the fact of 
this remarkable minority—a sparse Jewish 
ingredient of three per cent in a nation of 
110 000 000—attaining in 50 years a degree of 
control that would be impossible to a ten times 
larger group of any other race, that creates the 
Jewish Question. Three per cent of any other 
people would scarcely occasion comment, 
because we would not meet with a representa-
tive of them whenever we went in high places 
. . . Yet we meet the Jew everywhere in the upper 
circles, literally everywhere there is power.64
When Icke proceeds to list the members of 
a world-controlling conspiracy, he is implicitly 
making the same point, first drawing attention 
to the small number of Jews in the United States, 
and then drawing attention to what will seem to 
be a large number of Jews with some degree of 
political influence. (This number only appears 
to be large because Icke provides no context for 
it: there are thousands of individuals whom one 
could include in an arbitrary list of any large 
nation’s most influential people.) While Icke 
claims that he will not be pointing out “Jewish 
people here and . . . Jewish people there,” most 
of the names he recites are obviously Jewish. The 
production of such lists is a common strategy 
among conspiracy theorists. As Byford argues,
Even just the constant repetition of recognisably 
Jewish names in the context of the narrative of 
conspiracy, and the allusion to Jewish individ-
uals and families as the source of longstanding 
sinister influence in the world, desensitises 
the consumers of these seemingly innocuous 
conspiracy theories and broadens the bound-
aries of acceptable opinion to the point where 
the notion of a Jewish conspiracy becomes 
recognised as a legitimate explanation of polit-
ical and historical reality.65 
This is the underlying logic of Icke’s lecture. 
Icke connects four individuals to the supposed 
“Rothschild Zionist” secret society without 
specifically identifying them as “Rothschild 
Zionists.” Of the four, three are Jewish and have 
Jewish names, while one is not Jewish but has 
a Jewish name because his father was Jewish. 
In addition to these four individuals, there are 
twenty-five more whom Icke directly identifies 
as “Rothschild Zionists.” At least twenty of the 
twenty-five are Jewish. Of the remaining five, 
two have Jewish or German names, and one is 
described as a “Rothschild Zionist . . . in belief 
if nothing else”—which clearly implies that one 
would usually be expected to be a “Rothschild 
Zionist” in something more than belief. Again, 
the implication is that the great majority of 
“Rothschild Zionists” will be Jews. 
It is important to emphasise that Icke’s 
lecture does not engage with the real-world 
politics of Israel. It is, rather, an example of 
what Cohen calls “anti-Zionism without Zion”: 
a form of discourse on something which is 
labelled “Zionism” yet “transcends anything 
done by the Israeli state” and as such “could 
just as easily exist without Israel,” being simply 
a repackaging of traditional antisemitic ideas 
under a different name.66 Rather than set out 
any sort of rational analysis, Icke evokes the 
discursive traditions of antisemitism through 
innuendo, creating the impression of a sinister 
network merely by reciting Jewish name after 
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Jewish name and appending to each the racial-
ly-charged label of “Rothschild Zionist”: “David 
Axelrod, Rothschild Zionist . . . George Soros, 
Rothschild Zionist . . . Henry Kissinger, massive 
Rothschild Zionist,” and so on. In Icke’s hands, 
the “Rothschild Zionist” label appears indiscrim-
inately applicable to anyone who both (a) holds 
a prominent social position and (b) either (i) is 
Jewish or (ii) can plausibly be associated with 
Jews. Labelling individuals in this way impli-
cates them in a supposedly powerful and secre-
tive network, of whose existence Icke apparently 
needs provide no further evidence.
In Icke’s discourse, as in that of earlier 
conspiracy fantasists, it appears that any Jew who 
achieves prominence can potentially be accused 
of being part of a conspiracy on grounds merely 
of the conjunction of his or her (a) Jewishness and 
(b) prominence. This is a well-established mode 
of thought on the far right: Billig, for example, 
observed that, for some of the National Front 
members whom he interviewed in the 1970s, 
“the fact that a leading politician, financier, or 
communist might be Jewish [in itself ] constituted 
sufficient proof that he must be a Zionist conspir-
ator.”67 The deadly potential of that way of under-
standing the world has been apparent since 1922, 
when a leading German politician was murdered 
by men who believed him literally to be one of the 
Elders of Zion.68 But such accusations have also 
been used to justify violence against others besides 
the individuals directly accused, because the 
purported existence of the conspiracy places all 
Jews under suspicion: to use the words of an 
antisemitic publication from which we have 
already heard, the implication is that “[t]he inter-
national Jew . . . rules not because he is rich, but 
because in a most marked degree, he . . . avails 
himself of a racial loyalty and solidarity the like 
of which exists in no other human group.”69 In 
1941, a Nazi propaganda directive issued by 
the Reich Press Office “listed . . . [Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s] Jewish friends and advisers” in a 
pretence of informing German citizens of “the 
institutional location and the personal identity of 
the Jews striving for power in the United States” 
and thus supplying “the names and faces of the 
American branch of the international Jewish 
conspiracy.”70 Within months, the genocide of 
European Jews had begun.
ANALYSIS II: QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS 
OF COMMENTS ON DAVID ICKE’S VIDEO “WHAT 
OTHERS DARE NOT SAY”
The Interest of YouTube Comments 
The historical analysis above has established that 
Icke’s argument in the video is both virulently 
racist and substantially derivative of a discursive 
tradition closely tied to the genocidal antisem-
itism of the extreme right. However, it might 
have been the case that it met with sustained 
criticism online and was rejected by the audience 
to which YouTube displayed it—in which case, 
we could perhaps feel reassured that it had been 
able to cause comparatively little harm. For that 
reason alone, we should look systematically at 
the responses that it elicited via the YouTube 
platform. But there is a further reason for taking 
its online reception seriously. 
This is that comments left on YouTube 
videos provide the illusion of peer review for 
the content of those videos. More popular 
comments are ranked more highly in YouTube’s 
default view, with the most popular of them 
appearing directly below the videos on which 
they were made. Presentation alongside the 
videos themselves gives such comments some-
thing like the privileged status of what Genette 
calls “paratexts”: subsidiary textual elements 
positioned in order to exert “an influence on 
the public . . . at the service of a better reception 
for the [primary] text.”71 Comments on YouTube 
videos are closely analogous to customer reviews 
on products sold by online retailers, and there 
exists a considerable body of empirical research 
whose findings suggest that such reviews exert 
a measurable influence on purchasing deci-
sions.72 It is therefore by no means fanciful to 
suppose that a video’s surrounding penumbra 
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of comments might influence its viewers in their 
decision to “buy” its message.
Research Questions
The aim of the second analysis presented in 
this study is therefore to discover the extent 
to which the active audience for this YouTube 
video responded with endorsement or critique 
(whether directly, by commenting, or indirectly, 
by “liking” comments), as well as the extent to 
which it expressed and endorsed a bigoted or 
hateful view with regard to what the first part 
of the analysis has established to be the video’s 
implicit target, that is, Jewry. Two research ques-
tions follow from this aim:
RQ1. How frequent are comments which 
support Icke and/or his message (without neces-
sarily expressing antisemitic views of their own), 
and comments which express antisemitic views 
of their own (without necessarily endorsing 
Icke and/or his message), as compared to 
comments which do not, and how many “likes” 
are received by comments which challenge Icke 
and/or his message, as compared to comments 
which do not.
RQ2. How many “likes” are received by 
comments which support Icke and/or his 
message (without necessarily expressing antise-
mitic views of their own), and comments which 
express antisemitic views of their own (without 
necessarily endorsing Icke and/or his message), 
as compared to comments which do not, and 
how many “likes” are received by comments 
which challenge Icke and/or his message, as 
compared to comments which do not.
If comments supporting Icke and/or his 
message are more numerous and/or more 
popular than comments which challenge Icke 
and/or his message, then this will suggest 
that the active audience with which YouTube 
furnished Icke was more receptive than critical. 
And if comments expressing antisemitic views, 
are more numerous and/or more popular than 
comments which challenge Icke and/or his 
message, then this will suggest that it responded 
to the antisemitism of his message by making or 
endorsing further expressions of antisemitism 
more frequently than by making or endorsing 
critical comments. If this is the case, then such 
findings would also suggest that comments of 
these types, rather than of the critical type, may 
have had a systematic advantage in terms of 
their own audience exposure, and therefore been 
gifted greater and more frequent opportunities 
to exert an influence on the video’s YouTube 
reception. 
Data Collection and Coding
There are two categories of comments on a 
YouTube video page: top-level comments, made 
on the video itself, and second-level comments, 
which respond to top-level comments. While 
it would have been possible to select a random 
sample of comments on the video using 
the YouTube API, this would have removed 
comments from their argumentative context, 
rendering accurate classification problematic. 
Instead, the following procedure was employed. 
First, the SORT BY > Newest first option 
was selected on the video page and the page was 
scrolled downward until all top-level comments 
less than three years old were displayed. Second, 
all comment threads were expanded, revealing all 
second-level comments on the aforementioned 
top-level comments. Third, all top-level and 
second-level comments were expanded to full 
length. Fourth, the complete page was exported 
as a PDF. 
Content analysis begins with a process much 
like that used in coding responses to open ques-
tionnaire items, with the aim being to categorise 
texts or messages (here, YouTube comments) in 
a replicable way.73 Here, a simple coding scheme 
(see below) was used to classify comments 
according to whether they supported or chal-
lenged Icke and his message, and according 
to whether they expressed recognisably anti-
Jewish views. A value was assigned to each of 
Daniel Allington and Tanvi Joshi
44 Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism
four variables for each comment. Three variables 
were categorical. The fourth variable was simply 
a transcription of the number of “likes” which 
the YouTube interface recorded each comment as 
having received. The variables and their possible 
values are given in table 1.74
A total of 1123 comments were collected 
and coded, following the above process. 
The resulting data were then entered elec-
tronically by a member of staff at Quilliam 
International. The 169 most popular top-level 
comments at the time of data collection (on 
the default YouTube interface) were addition-
ally collected and coded for calculation of 
inter-rater reliability. Percentage agreement, 
Cohen’s kappa, and Krippendorff ’s alpha are 
provided in table 2. Percentage agreement 
ranged from 90–99%, while kappa and alpha 
ranged from 0.77–0.81. (For comparison, 
Lombard et al. observe that a coefficient of 
0.80 on most indices is generally considered 
acceptable for most purposes but that “more 
liberal criteria are usually used for . . . indices 
known to be conservative,” such as kappa 
and alpha.75) It is concluded that the coding 
scheme is adequately reliable.
Findings: Frequency and Popularity of 
Supportive, Challenging, and Anti-Jewish 
Comments
For frequencies of codes within the sample, 
see fig.1 and table 3. 95% confidence inter-
vals were calculated with correction for the 
total number of comments, on the assumption 
that the sample can be regarded as effectively 
random. If that assumption is rejected, the 
confidence intervals should be ignored but 
the observed frequencies remain valid both 
as descriptive statistics for the sample and 
as best estimates for the total population of 
comments. As we see, supportive comments 
were more frequent than anti-Jewish 
comments, while challenging comments 
were the least frequent of all. The differences 
Table 1: Coding scheme
Variable Meaning Possible values
Supports 
Icke?
Comment expresses favourable evaluation of David Icke or of this particular David 




Comment expresses unfavourable evaluation of David Icke or of this particular 
David Icke video, including by denying or questioning the truth of any of Icke’s 
assertions in the video
Yes / No
Anti-Jewish? Comment expresses antisemitic views, including by applying Icke’s accusations 
to real-world Jewish collectivities (including the State of Israel and its citizens). 
However, comments that use only Icke’s term, “Rothschild Zionists,” or that 
refer to Jewish individuals mentioned by Icke, are excluded
Yes / No
Likes Number of likes recorded by the YouTube interface Integer
Table 2: Measures of inter-rater reliability
Variable % k a
Supports Icke 90 0.77 0.77
Challenges Icke 99 0.79 0.79
Anti-Jewish 92 0.81 0.81
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Supports Icke Challenges Icke Anti−Jewish
Table 3: Comments coded as supportive, challenging, or anti-Jewish, and otherwise
%
Variable Value n Obs. Low High
Supports Icke No 693 62 58 66
Supports Icke Yes 430 38 34 42
Challenges Icke No 964 86 83 89
Challenges Icke Yes 159 14 11 17
Anti-Jewish No 886 79 75 82
Anti-Jewish Yes 237 21 18 25
95% confidence interval calculated on the assumption that the data can be treated as equivalent to a random sample of 
comments.
between these frequencies were all outside 
the margin of error, which means that (given 
acceptance of the assumption above) we can 
be reasonably confident that a similar hier-
archy would also have been observed had it 
been possible to code all 4275 comments on 
the video.
Although the most popular comment in the 
sample received 428 likes, the distribution had 
a long tail, with 133 comments (or 12% of the 
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sample) receiving only a single like, and 817 
comments (or 73% of the sample) receiving no 
likes at all. 
Fig. 2 shows the mean number of likes for 
comments which were and were not coded as 
supportive, challenging, and anti-Jewish, and 
supportive and/or anti-Jewish, while table 4 
shows the median, mean, and standard deviation 
for numbers of likes on comments coded in the 
same way. Comments that challenged Icke or 
his message received fewer likes than comments 
that did not, which Welch’s unequal variances 
t-test confirms to be highly statistically signif-
icant on the assumption that the sample can 
be treated as equivalent to a random sample, 
t (982.49) = -4.34, p < 0.001, 95% CI [-4.69, 
-1.77]. Comments that supported Icke or his 
message received more likes on average than those 
that were not (including comments that did not 
support Icke or his message yet were anti-Jewish 
in their own right), although this was not statis-
tically significant, t (523.10) = 1.73, p = 0.085, 
95% CI [-0.37, 5.71], and comments that were 
anti-Jewish received more likes on average than 
comments that were not (including comments 
that were not anti-Jewish in their own right yet 
supported Icke or his message), although that too 
fell short of statistical significance, t (365.85) = 
1.63, p = 0.105, 95% CI [-0.54, 5.68]. The 
greatest difference in numbers of likes was with 
regard to comments that were supportive of Icke 
or his message and/or were anti-Jewish, which 
on average received nearly six times more likes 
than comments which were neither supportive 
of Icke or his message nor anti-Jewish. This 
difference was very highly statistically signif-
icant, t (589.38) = 3.56, p < 0.001, 95% CI 
[1.99, 6.88].
In fact, anti-Jewish comments, and 
comments supportive of Icke or his message, 
were overwhelmingly dominant among the most 
popular comments. Fig. 3 shows the top 50 
comments by number of likes, with the shape 
of each point indicating how the comment in 
question was coded. 38 of the top 50—including 
all of the top 10—were coded as supportive of 
Icke and/or as anti-Jewish. None was coded as 
challenging towards Icke or his message. Indeed, 























Figure 2. Mean likes for comments by code
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Table 4: Likes for comments coded as supportive, challenging, anti-Jewish, and supportive and/or anti-
Jewish, and comments coded otherwise: median, mean and standard deviation
Likes
Variable Value Md M SD
Supports Icke Yes 0.00 4.80 30.46
Supports Icke No 0.00 2.14 12.72
Challenges Icke Yes 0.00 0.38  0.95
Challenges Icke No 0.00 3.62 23.02
Anti-Jewish Yes 0.00 5.19 21.72
Anti-Jewish No 0.00 2.62 21.24
Supp./Anti-J. Yes 0.00 5.33 29.56
Supp./Anti-J. No 0.00 0.90  3.68











Table 5 presents a logistic regression model 
estimating the probability that a comment is 
neither anti-Jewish nor supportive of Icke or 
his message, given the number of likes that it 
received. Fig. 4 visualises the model (upper and 
lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval are 
visualised as dashed lines and actual observations 
are visualised as dots, scaled to compensate for 
over-plotting). For a comment with no likes, 
the probability of a comment’s neither being 
supportive of Icke nor anti-Jewish is estimated 
to be about 50%. But as the number of likes 
rises, the estimated probability rapidly falls close 
to zero.
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Table 5: Logistic regression model (estimated probability of a comment’s being neither supportive of Icke 
nor anti-Jewish, by number of likes)
Est. Low High SE t p
(Intercept)   0.04 -0.08   0.16 0.06   0.62 0.537
Likes -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 0.01 -3.08 0.002
Residual degrees of freedom: 1121.
Significance and 95% confidence interval calculated on the assumption that the data can be treated as equivalent to a 
random sample of comments.
Figure 4. Estimated probability that a comment is neither supportive of Icke nor anti-Jewish, by number of 










As explained above, overrepresentation of 
supportive and anti-Jewish comments among 
the most popular comments from members of 
this particular video’s active audience may have 
had important consequences for the wider audi-
ence because, on the default view, the YouTube 
interface furnishes the most popular top-level 
comments with the most advantageous posi-
tion on any given video page. To encounter 
less popular top-level comments, one must 
either switch to a different view or scroll down-
ward—sometimes a very considerable distance. 
(Most second-level comments are hidden until 
the threads containing them are expanded; full 
expansion of a thread may require several clicks.)
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The historical discourse analysis presented in 
this article demonstrates the persistence of classic 
antisemitic tropes in the discourse of one of the 
twenty-first century’s best-known professional 
conspiracy fantasists. The antisemitism of Icke’s 
lecture was encrypted, but—to a viewer versed 
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in conspiracist culture—it would not have been 
at all difficult to decrypt, because its tropes 
were derived from many decades of antisemitic 
elaboration on the Protocols. As the history of 
antisemitic conspiracy fantasy presented above 
shows, such discourse has played a role in 
inspiring and justifying atrocities from the early 
twentieth century to the present day. It seems 
unlikely that the lecture would have been able to 
exert much ideological influence on the typical 
English-speaking adult. Yet a combination of 
social media sharing and the YouTube recom-
mendation algorithm are likely to have furnished 
it with an audience disproportionately composed 
of individuals predisposed towards receptiveness 
to its content or its form. By what other means 
could a rambling and cliché-ridden harangue 
from a long-retired sportsman have received 
hundreds of thousands of views, tens of thou-
sands of likes, and thousands of comments—a 
much greater proportion of which would appear 
to have been supportive than been critical? 
In finding that Icke’s active YouTube audi-
ence appears to have been so welcoming towards 
his “Rothschild Zionist” conspiracy fantasy, the 
quantitative analysis which this article also pres-
ents contributes to scholarship in two further 
principal ways. First, it provides evidence that, 
even when conspiracy accusations superficially 
appear only to concern specific individuals and 
an entirely imaginary organisation, elements of 
the audience may understand those accusations 
to incriminate an entire category of people. If 
that is not the case, it is hard to imagine why 
anti-Jewish comments should have been so 
frequently made in response to a video that 
positioned itself only as criticising “Rothschild 
Zionists” and not Jews, and also to under-
stand why such comments should have been so 
popular.76 
Second, the findings of the quantitative 
analysis illustrate the dangers of outsourcing the 
evaluation of content to an online user commu-
nity. To reiterate, it is not only that comments 
supportive of Icke or his message were far more 
numerous than comments challenging the same, 
but that the most popular supportive comments 
received hundreds of likes while the most 
popular challenging comment received only 
six, and that the YouTube interface by default 
gives more prominent placement to top-level 
comments with greater numbers of likes. At the 
time of data collection, the top comment on 
the video discussed here described Judaism as “a 
racist, psychopathic supremacist ideology” and 
a “gushing geyser of wickedness and amorality.” 
Placed directly below the video by the default 
setting of the YouTube web interface, this viru-
lently bigoted statement is likely to have been 
the only comment seen by many viewers. To find 
an argument against the video or its antisemi-
tism, the viewer would have to dive into second-
level comments, change the SORT BY option 
from Top comments to Newest first, or scroll 
through huge numbers of bigoted, positive, or 
neutral comments: in the default view, the first 
substantive argument against the video’s content 
was found in the 154th place from the top. It 
is unlikely to have been seen by many viewers, 
buried as it was beneath more popular top-level 
comments.
It is with good reason that online retailers 
such as Amazon do not simply show customers 
popular reviews, instead helping them to make 
an informed choice by presenting them with 
positive and negative reviews side by side, and by 
enabling them to browse and compare both. We 
have argued that comments on YouTube videos 
and other forms of online content may function 
analogously to customer reviews, influencing 
viewers’ estimation of the plausibility of video 
content by providing it with the illusion of peer 
review. In ranking such comments by popu-
larity rather than quality, and making no differ-
entiation between supportive and challenging 
comments, YouTube allows the more numerous 
side in an argument to drive out all suggestion of 
dissent, creating a false impression of unanimity. 
Although conspiracy believers often dismiss 
conspiracy sceptics as “sheeple,” it was arguably 
those who found Icke’s video persuasive who 
were following the herd—which is to say, the 
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apparent herd produced by YouTube’s default 
ranking of comments by popularity.
It has been argued that “the media ecosystem 
has evolved in ways that undermine the likeli-
hood . . . that true and high-quality news and 
information will overcome false and low-quality 
news [and] information.”77 The video whose 
content and reception we have analysed is 
the epitome of false, low-quality information. 
Yet comments that challenged its irrationality 
and antisemitism stood little chance of over-
coming its falsehood and low quality, given the 
combined effects of popularity-based ranking 
and systematically fewer likes. Maintenance of 
such a status quo is manifestly irresponsible.
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